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GARY SHAPIRO 
Intention and Interpretation 
a Semiotic Analysis 
. 
1n Art: 
KANT WAS PERHAPS the first philosopher 
to note the distinctive puzzle, verging on 
paradox, which marks our dealings with 
art. Works of art seem to place us under an 
obligation to interpret them and yet we are 
convinced that our interpretations will 
never be exhaustive. Kant attempts to ac-
count for this peculiar phenomenon by 
talking of "purposiveness without purpose" 
or of the aesthetic idea as "a representation 
of the imagination to which no concept is 
adequate." We are constrained to see some 
pattern or organization in a work of art 
and this is typically understood as a teleo-
logical or purposive organization which we 
may feel tempted to attribute to the inten-
tions or experiences of some rational agent; 
yet we do not complete this attribution be-
cause it seems as if there is always some 
additional or more complex purposive pat-
tern which escapes our comprehension. For 
Kant the phenomenon is to be understood 
in terms of the types of judgment and the 
need to find some link between the worlds 
of nature and of freedom; and it is impor-
tant for his theory that he demonstrate that 
art is beautiful only insofar as it approxi-
mates to the beauty of nature. Others with 
similar metaphysical interests have intro-
duced concepts like Schopenhauer's will or 
Hegel's absolute idea to cover roughly the 
same ground. Those who are dissatisfied 
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with such speculative schemes have sug-
gested that the puzzle can be dissolved 
either by discovering a way of identifying 
the meaning of a work of art, by adopting a 
completely relativistic account of artistic 
meaning, or by abandoning talk of mean-
ing and interpretation in favor of talk 
about aesthetic surfaces or physical objects. 
What I want to suggest is that the appar-
ent puzzle becomes somewhat intelligible 
when we understand the work of art as a 
sign. For a sign, as defined by Peirce, is some-
thing that stands for something to someone 
(or to another sign). So that a sign is con-
strained or limited in meaning by its own 
nature and its object, but open to 
interpretation because it must address some 
interpreter (or, more technically, it must 
have an interpretant). Now in order to 
make good this suggestion it is necessary to 
examine some aspects of the sign-relation. 
For it has been claimed, on plausible 
grounds, that semiotic theories of the arts 
are radically deficient insofar as they are 
unable to give either an account of the way 
in which the sign is representative of its 
object or of the nature of the interpretant 
in art. Charles Stevenson has suggested that 
although a semiotic aesthetics must be com-
mitted to demonstrating the iconic charac-
ter of signs in art, no adequate description 
of this iconic character has yet been given. 
He also claims that the theory is unable to 
provide a way of specifying the proper in-
terpretant in the artistic situation and notes 
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that in practice we find an indefinite plural- 
ity of responses to works of art which do 
not seem to cluster around a single paradig- 
matic meaning.l While these objections 
may reflect some actual weaknesses in some 
types of semiotic aesthetics, it seems to me 
that the central ideas of the theory may be 
strong enough to withstand the criticism. 
Once these problematic areas are properly 
explicated the theory may also help us to 
restate Kant's puzzle. Peirce, who intro- 
duced the semiotic terminology, provides 
some useful distinctions, although he never 
was explicitly concerned with the way that 
signs function in art. So while it may be 
possible to follow him part of the way, 
some caution should be employed in appro- 
priating his ideas. The account which fol- 
lows is somewhat skeletal; if it is viable, 
however, it provides a way of talking about 
significance in art which is not forced to 
accept one of the several unsatisfactory the- 
ories which purport to discern a single and 
unique meaning in each work. It should 
also, if viable, be capable of explicating dif- 
ferences among various arts and providing 
a framework within which a plurality of 
possible relations between artists and their 
audiences may be understood. 
I 
To consider a work of art as a sign is, 
among other things, to treat it as having an 
object or being a sign of something. Here 
problems arise when we try to say what, in 
general, are the objects of art-signs and how 
it is that the sign represents its object. 
Many suggestions fail because they are not 
sufficiently comprehensive; there are just 
too many counter-examples. So if it is sug- 
gested that the object of an art-sign is an 
assertion, it is not difficult to counter this 
claim by referring to abstract paintings or 
non-program music where assertions can be 
detected only by an enormous effort of 
imagination. We may deal in a parallel 
fashion with the suggestion that the object 
of all artistic signs is some particular emo- 
tion (Clive Bell) or an emotion of some 
general type (Tolstoy). This discovery 
should not be too disconcerting, for signs 
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generally do not need to refer to objects of 
some given sort; and art proverbially is said 
to be unconstricted in its choice of mate- 
rials and subject-matter. 
The failure to say anything more at this 
point, however, provides ammunition for 
the thesis that all generalizations about art 
are either trivial or false. Now in talking 
about the objects of signs another sort of 
approach is available. If we cannot initially 
limit the range of possible objects we may 
be able to say what the mode of representa- 
tion is by which the sign is related to its 
object. Here the most frequent suggestion 
has been that works of art are icons of their 
objects, that is, that they resemble their ob- 
jects in some way. So landscapes, like pho- 
tographs, resemble the scenes that they are 
of, and music, it has been claimed, bears 
some structural similarity to the emotions. 
The relation of resemblance may assume 
more or less complex forms: Peirce distin- 
guishes images, diagrams, and metaphors 
which resemble their objects by qualitative 
similarity, structural analogy, or by repre- 
senting "the representative character of a 
representamen by representing a parallel- 
ism in something else." 2 
Nevertheless it seems to me that iconicity 
is not the central representative relation in 
art. For one thing, there are many icons such 
as reflections in mirrors or roadmaps which 
are clearly not works of art. My photograph 
and Constable's painting may both be 
iconic of the same landscape, yet my "pic- 
ture" may be intended, used, and under- 
stood as nothing more than a reminder of 
my travels, while Constable's is felt, with 
good reason, to have some further signifi- 
cance. The further significance here might 
be expressed by saying that Constable's 
painting not only resembles the scene but, 
among other things, should be regarded as 
an intentional representation of it. So far 
this suffices to distinguish the painting from 
casual reflections but not from photographs 
and maps. Now although all of these may 
be intentionally iconic, we characteristically 
dwell on the intentional iconicity of the 
painting in a way which we do not when 
considering the tourist photograph or the 
roadmap. In the latter cases an interest in 
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the fact that someone meant the things to 
be iconic arises mainly when the things fail 
to resemble or when we look at them as 
symptoms of personal biography. We may 
not be able to read the map, or we may 
wonder why the photographer cut John off 
at the neck. 
In order to explicate this difference it 
may be useful to distinguish various sorts of 
representation at this point. While an icon 
resembles its objects in some way, an index 
is connected with its object existentially, for 
example by pointing to it or being an effect 
of it. A symbol represents its object by 
means of an association of ideas, a conven- 
tion, or a law. While a sign may represent 
in more than one of these ways, there is no 
necessity that it do so. The difference be- 
tween the two sorts of iconic signs discussed 
previously amounts to the difference be- 
tween a relatively simple icon and a sign 
which uses an icon but is also symbolic. 
One way of expressing the difference is to 
point out that icons (and indices) are natu- 
ral signs while symbols require convention. 
In the case of the painting the point is that 
someone has chosen to exhibit an icon of a 
scene as an icon. By a conventional symbol- 
ism associated with the practices of art our 
attention is called to the fact that the icon 
is meant to be an icon. 
We might consider, briefly, the proposal 
that a work of art represents its object in- 
dexically. Thus, it might be suggested that 
a Pollock painting is an index of Pollock's 
action in making the painting. This must 
be at least part of the truth. Just as the 
bullet hole in mouldy bread (to use Peirce's 
example) is an index of the bullet's being 
fired, so these drippings and scrapings are 
indices of a series of actions in which Pol- 
lock dripped and scraped paint. Surely the 
arrangement of paint is not iconic of Pol- 
lock's action, for it does not resemble hu- 
man movements (although it may, acciden- 
tally or not, be iconic of something else). 
Yet there is a distinction to be made be- 
tween a sign incorporating an index and 
being an index without qualification. My 
painted walls are also an index of my activ- 
ity in painting or, better, a scraped surface 
is al index of the scraper's scraping. Now 
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Pollock's painting may be said to exhibit its 
indexical character, while my painted or 
scraped walls will hopefully not be re- 
garded as indices but as walls. 
The relation of the art-sign to its object, 
then, is not iconic or indexical, but sym- 
bolic; it represents by means of a conven- 
tional symbolism rather than by being a 
natural sign. This conclusion is not innocu- 
ous, for there are strong theoretical tenden- 
cies to construe things otherwise. For expres- 
sion theorists the enduring vehicle in the 
situation is a sign of a certain experience of 
the artist's in just the same way that a cry 
of pain or a gesture is a sign of someone's 
state of mind. A concomitant of this ap- 
proach is that that which is distinctive of 
art must be found not in the kind of sign 
process which art is, but in a special prop- 
erty of the object represented. So Colling- 
wood supposes that the artist expresses 
emotion in a distinctive and final form; the 
ultimate emotion in artistic expression is a 
completely determinate individual feeling, 
and the artist is distinguished from other 
men by his ability to achieve this definitive 
articulation. Dewey takes the object to be 
"an experience" characterized by its inclu- 
siveness, organic unity, and consummatory 
quality. A consequence of these theories of 
art as a natural sign is to make the notion 
of art much more elastic than it is ordinar- 
ily taken to be. On the one hand, much 
which passes as art in the considered judg- 
ment of critics and audiences is to be ex- 
cluded if the artist's experience is not of the 
paradigmatic type; and much which we do 
not ordinarily take to be art replaces it 
because it may be correlated with the expe- 
rience in question. 
The truth of theories of the Collingwood- 
Dewey type lies in the claim that works of 
art, to be such, must be regarded as human 
products. Following this suggestion, it may 
be appropriate to revise an earlier sugges- 
tion by finding at least this generic feature 
of the objects of art-signs: they must be 
human intentions or experiences. What I 
want to stress is that these experiences or 
intentions are represented symbolically, 
rather than naturally; and I am dubious of 
attempts, like Dewey's and Collingwood's, 
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to delineate in much detail what these in- 
tentions or experiences must be. If we begin 
with those things which are usually taken 
to be works of art, we find an indefinite 
variety of such intentions; while if we begin 
by specifying the intentions in advance we 
find it impossible to correlate these particu- 
lar sorts of intentions with that which we 
take to be art. Those who have spoken of 
an "intentional fallacy" have generally 
been thinking of the tendency to under- 
stand art in terms of extra-artistic inten- 
tions of some kind, such as the sublimated 
expression of repressed desires, or partici- 
pating in the class struggle. As practical 
advice to critics and audiences this admoni- 
tion is excellent. What it seems to overlook 
is the need to discern the particular way in 
which we are to regard a work of art. When 
we interpret a piece of literature, for exam- 
ple, we look for what Northrop Frye calls 
the "radical of presentation," the voice with 
which the work speaks. The narrator may 
be an omniscient story teller, as in the epic, 
or a solitary voice overheard, as in the lyric 
mode. In painting, to use an example of 
Panofsky's, a "city in the sky" may be a 
vision, an actual heavenly city, or simply a 
far off city represented by an unusual set of 
conventions; the painting itself, as a sur- 
face, does not resolve the ambiguity.3 To do 
that we need to see the painting as a sign of 
an intention to represent the city in some 
particular way. 
The situation described here has a cer- 
tain amount of looseness about it. We inter- 
pret an art-sign as having some intention as 
its object, but we are never in a position to 
give an exhaustive catalogue of the basic 
types of artistic intention. If we abandoned 
the first restriction, it would be possible to 
construct a completely morphological aes- 
thetics, making reference to the immedi- 
ately presented qualities and structures of 
art-objects; but as Gombrich has suggested 
this would result in our seeing no signifi- 
cant difference between two paintings with 
similar morphology, even though one was 
extremely traditional and the other a dar- 
ing innovation.4 The second limitation 
arises from the fact that one of the things 
which art does is not simply to seek new 
material but to present what it does in new 
ways. Many artistic intentions are to be 
understood as revisions or comments upon 
previous traditions and styles; so to antici- 
pate the possible forms of the artist's inten- 
tion would be to do his work for him. 
It might be suggested that all this talk 
about the necessity of intention as the ob- 
ject of the artistic sign simply amounts to 
the old and trivial claim that works of art 
must be artifacts. However, there are some 
complications. On the semiotic account 
given here, works of art are not only arti- 
facts; they manifest or exhibit their artifac- 
tuality. And just as it is not clear that there 
is any exhaustive account of the ways in 
which something may be presented as an 
artifact, so there is no apparent limitation 
on what might count as an artifact. Du- 
champ's urinal and similar ready-mades 
seem to have established that the artist 
need not be an artificer (in the sense of a 
planner or craftsman). Natural objects, too, 
might be taken to be artifacts in an ex- 
tended sense if someone exhibits them as 
works of art; so a piece of driftwood or a 
patterned slab of marble become artifacts, 
in a sense, because someone exhibits them 
in a certain way. 
I am suggesting that we need to take an 
empirical and pluralistic approach to the 
nature of intention in two ways. On the 
one hand, the history of art reveals an in- 
definite variety of artistic purposes or ends: 
think of Byzantine mosaics, Bartok's music, 
and Pope's poetry. Each of the many inten- 
tional theories of interpretation is probably 
useful in helping us to discern types of ar- 
tistic intent of which we might otherwise be 
ignorant. Yet each fails in its claims to have 
discovered the fundamental form of inten- 
tion for all art. Moreover artistic intention 
often exhibits what Freud calls over-determi- 
nation; there may be a complex network of 
purposes involved in the production of a 
work, even to the point where we hesitate 
to say that they are all summed up in a 
single dominant intention. A second respect 
in which theory should be methodologically 
pluralistic is in questions about the analysis 
of intention itself, i.e., whether it is to be 
construed as an introspectible mental event, 
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a set of dispositions to act, or in some other 
fashion. Certainly we often do attribute in- 
tentions to artists which they could not 
have articulated themselves. Empirical 
method requires us to admit that intentions 
may simply be more or less vague, complex, 
linguistically formulable by the agent, and 
so on. However, this pluralistic account of 
intention need not be taken as excluding 
the possibility of a comprehensive aesthetic 
theory; for such a theory may deal with the 
relations between intention, art object, and 
interpretation (as does the semiotic ac- 
count) while surrendering the attempt to 
find a determinate form of all artistic inten- 
tions. Of course intention, if it is to play a 
role in the theory should have some com- 
mon nature underlying its plurality of 
forms; yet this nature may be of a very 
general and even vague sort. 
II 
Supposing that this account of art as sym- 
bolic of intentions is accepted, can we go 
on to identify the meaning of a work of art 
with the artist's intention? This step has 
been taken without too much hesitation by 
intentionalistic theorists such as Erwin Pan- 
ofsky and Albert Hofstadter.5 However, it 
is not clear that this identification is either 
necessary or permissible. For while the art- 
ist's intention, as the object of the art-sign, 
is a condition of the sign's being meaning- 
ful, it is not identical with the sign's mean- 
ing. This can be put in more technical 
terms: the meaning of the sign is not the 
sign's object but its interpretant or the rule 
by which it determines its interpretant. 
The sign's meaning is what it will be inter- 
preted as. In order to talk about the mean- 
ing of a work of art, then, we must talk 
about its interpretation. 
Some doubts concerning semiotic aesthet- 
ics have focused on just this question of our 
ability to locate the interpretant of a work 
of art. Stevenson seems to suggest that since 
no one has been able to say what the 
unique interpretant of an aesthetic sign is, 
the semiotic theory is radically incomplete. 
Now of course there are a variety of theo- 
ries which purport to say how a work of art 
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is to be properly interpreted. The appropri- 
ate response is held to be emotional, or 
cognitive, or active; more specifically, var- 
ious theorists have held that it is an emo- 
tion like or unlike those we experience in 
everyday life, that it is propositional knowl- 
edge about the world or a kind of intuition, 
or that it is a reorganization of our practi- 
cal attitudes or an acceptance of our tragic 
condition. However, it seems to me that the 
failure to identify the interpretant of the 
art-sign is not a weakness of the semiotic 
theory, but one of its strengths. 
To ask, as Stevenson does, that we say 
what the interpretant of the sign is, is to 
misunderstand both what it is to be a sign 
and, more specifically, what it is to be a 
work of art. A sign is the sort of thing 
which requires interpretation, but to which 
no single interpretant is adequate. This sit- 
uation arises from the fact that the inter- 
pretant of a sign is itself a sign. A single 
sign is indeterminate in meaning insofar as 
it is capable of giving rise to a multiplicity 
of interpretants at a given time and to an 
indefinite series of interpretants over a pe- 
riod of time. But how and for what reason 
would we want to single out one of these 
interpretants as the only proper meaning of 
a sign? Now of course we do frequently 
believe that we know the meaning of a con- 
cept, a theory, or even of a work of art. 
Peirce, for example, developed his pragma- 
tism as a method of discovering the ulti- 
mate or final interpretant of a sign (or at 
least of an "intellectual concept"). So per- 
haps what is needed is an account of the 
interpretants of art-signs in particular, 
rather than a consideration of the question 
whether any sign must have a unique 
meaning; for it may turn out that there are 
quite different types of signs. If this is the 
case, then it may also be possible to distin- 
guish artistic semiosis from other kinds of 
signification. 
It has been suggested, by Panofsky and 
others, that to understand a work of art we 
go through the same sort of process as when 
we understand a gesture.6 A gesture is sup- 
posed to be symbolic of an intention on the 
part of the gesturer; we can, in principle, 
understand the meaning of a gesture by 
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taking account of appropriate evidence con- 
cerning social conventions or tempera- 
mental peculiarities. In the case of works of 
art, the evidence is much more complex, for 
we need to know about stylistic conventions 
or iconographical material as well as under- 
standing the general cultural background 
of the work; this simply renders the inter- 
preter's or iconologist's task a difficult but 
not an impossible one. Yet there seems to 
be some disanalogies of art and gesture 
which should also be noted. A gesture is 
usually addressed to a quite definite and 
limited audience, while works of art tend to 
be of a more public nature. This, in turn, is 
connected with the fact that art tends to be 
enduring while gestures are ephemeral. (Ex- 
ceptions to both principles may be found, 
but it is significant that these differences 
hold in the primary cases). These variations 
are significant, because our supposition that 
the gesture has a determinate meaning is 
supported by its dependence on a specific 
context which furnishes us with the clues to 
its meaning; but the art object, while it 
arises out of a particular historical, social, 
and personal context endures so that it ac- 
quires a life beyond that context. This en- 
durance seems to be more than an acciden- 
tal feature, so much so that it is puzzling 
when artists turn, as recently, to the fabrica- 
tion of deliberately ephemeral works. It 
could be said that the work manages to 
escape or transcend its original context only 
to take a place within a larger one which 
might be called the "art-world." But to sup- 
pose that we can now discern the unique 
meaning of the work by understanding the 
conventions of its new context is to beg the 
question; for it may be that these conven- 
tions are such as to preclude the assignment 
of a single meaning to the work.7 
This last possibility seems closer to the 
practice of critics and audiences than does 
Panofsky's analogy. A work of art char- 
acteristically is susceptible of many in- 
terpretations, although not all interpreta- 
tions that are offered are acceptable. We may 
see Don Quixote as a madman, a tragic iron- 
ist, a metaphysician, or as a representative of 
the decaying gentry, but we cannot under- 
stand him coherently as a peasant or the king 
in disguise. One reason that we return to the 
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same work again and again, while we allow 
gestures to pass into oblivion, is that we con- 
tinue to find new meanings or new interpre- 
tations of the former, but not of the latter. 
This partial indeterminacy of the sign in 
art can be accounted for in terms of some 
of the general characteristics of signs. A 
sign does not determine its own interpreta- 
tion, but requires interpretation. This is 
especially true of symbols, which are signs 
primarily by virtue of a law or convention 
rather than by having a natural connection 
with their object. At any time, there is a 
limited continuum of possible interpreta- 
tions available of a given symbol. So a work 
of art admits of an indefinite number of 
possible interpretations within a given range, 
but it may exclude those that fall outside of 
this range. This can be illustrated most per- 
spicuously, perhaps, in the case of the per- 
forming arts: we can imagine an indefinite 
number of ways to produce Hamlet or to 
arrange a symphony, even if certain kinds of 
production or arrangement are precluded. 
This situation is not limited to the perform- 
ing arts, however; a painting or a poem must 
be taken in some way by its viewer or reader. 
Perhaps there is more freedom of interpreta- 
tion in these non-performing arts, for the 
viewers and readers are not subject to the 
many constraints of a practical nature which 
may restrict the freedom of the performer, 
such as limited resources and the necessity of 
finding an audience. 
It has sometimes been suggested that we 
ought to distinguish rather sharply between 
the performer's interpretation and the 
critic's or audience's understanding of a 
work.8 So it is claimed that scripts and 
scores do require interpretation or perform- 
ance while poems and paintings are more 
complete and need only be read or seen. 
There is a difference here, but it does not 
seem to me that it affects the general thrust 
of the semiotic theory. For my seeing or read- 
ing of a work is just as much mine as the 
performer's playing is his interpretation: in 
each case the work must be taken in a cer- 
tain way by emphasizing some aspects 
rather than others or by seeing things in a 
particular light. Of course, the performing 
arts introduce additional complications, for 
I may interpret a performance of Hamlet 
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rather than the script. The analogy of the 
two kinds of arts becomes clearer if we 
think of a poem as a script for its readers; 
to read a poem aloud is to implicitly or 
explicitly adopt a certain understanding or 
interpretation of it which is indicated by 
modulations of the voice. Silent readings 
are derivative from readings aloud, al- 
though some poems may be sufficiently 
complex to preclude the possibility of artic- 
ulating all of the aspects of a given 
interpretation by means of the voice alone. 
The idea that this indeterminacy of 
interpretation can be eliminated by intro- 
ducing the notion of the work of art as a 
type, of which its various performances or 
interpretations are tokens does not seem to 
be of much interest. For supposing that we 
adopt such a terminology, which may be 
illuminating in some ways, the question re- 
mains as to whether the type itself is fully 
determinate. It may be that the type is in- 
determinate in the sense that it has a legiti- 
mate variety of interpretants at a given 
time; but it may also be indeterminate by 
being capable of changing or growing. Let 
us return to the analogy of art and gesture. 
The gesture has the meaning that it does 
because of the contextual limitations ordi- 
narily associated with it. But what are the 
contextual limitations on the meaning of a 
work of art? Isn't it a feature of the prac- 
tices and conventions of art that we are led 
to see new meanings in a work because of 
changes in style and approach which post- 
date the work of art itself? Primitive masks, 
late Hellenistic sculpture and mannerist 
painting do come to be seen in a new light 
after the growth and popularity of non- 
representational modes in the visual arts. 
Of course, it might be suggested that this is 
a naive kind of projection of our own con- 
cerns and prejudices onto the past. Such 
projection does occur when we attempt to 
understand the gestures or customs of the 
past as if they were contemporary; we 
might, through ignorance or lack of imagi- 
nation, understand the hand-shaking of 
armed men in terms of our present social 
habit. Yet the analogy with gesture is to be 
used with care. For the work of art endures 
and is offered to a relatively non-specific 
public which revises its understanding of 
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art continuously. Just as a dramatist may be 
aware of offering his audience a script 
which admits of many possible productions 
and interpretations, so artists have recently 
come to think of their works as subject to 
undergoing drastic transformations of criti- 
cal appraisal as stylistic change accelerates 
in the arts. In semiotic terms, we may say 
that symbols grow through their interpreta- 
tion. The work of art is what Peirce calls a 
"living" symbol, like a constitution or a so- 
cial practice, which retains its identity 
through change.9 Often the meaning of a 
work of art grows through its interpretation 
by other works, as well as through critical 
understanding. It is not only pastiches, like 
Picasso's of Velasquez, but whole stylistic 
movements which comment on and articu- 
late the meaning of others, as in the case of 
the mannerist revision of renaissance per- 
spectivism. 
There is some limitation on this interpre- 
tative freedom which stems from the artist's 
intention and from the fact that the prod- 
uct (or the sign in the sign relationship) is 
an opaque element which prevents 
interpretation from ever coinciding pre- 
cisely with intention. Paul Valery has sug- 
gested that this situation gives rise to a "cre- 
ative misunderstanding" in which the work 
is destined to have more meanings for its 
collective audience than it does for its pro- 
ducer.10 If art were or approximated to 
being a direct means of communication (as 
some have supposed) then the work would 
tend to be a disposable instrument which 
would be exhausted by achieving a definite 
effect. The kind of opacity and indetermi- 
nacy detected by critics like Valery can per- 
haps be accounted for categorially by refer- 
ence to the indeterminacy of signs. 
There are two main ways of denying this 
indeterminacy of artistic meaning which it 
may be helpful to examine. The first tends 
to fall back on the conception of a determi- 
nate meaning for each work, while the sec- 
ond denies that there is any work which is 
identical in the various situations of per- 
formance and interpretation. Two varieties 
of the first position are of special interest; 
one takes the meaning to be identical with 
the experience or intention of the artist 
while the other takes it to be a kind of limit 
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which our various perceptions of the work 
tend to approximate. Collingwood's theory 
is a good example of the former sort of 
approach, and its is significant that his most 
obvious difficulty is to account for the status 
of the work as embodied in a medium (the 
sign-vehicle). Since he identifies the work 
with a determinate expression of the artist's 
and treats the embodied work as a kind of 
dead shell, he is forced to regard critical or 
audience response as aiming at a kind of 
total identity with the artist's experience. 
Although he wants to claim that art flour- 
ishes when there is some reciprocal relation 
between the artist's experience and the au- 
dience's understanding, his categorical ap- 
paratus does not allow him any systematic 
way of recognizing this reciprocity.11 
Alternatively, it has been suggested by 
Stephen Pepper and others that the work of 
art is the ideal limit of an infinite series of 
perceptions.l2 But why should we assume 
that informed and critical perception will 
tend to converge on one interpretation or 
understanding of the work? We may very 
well eliminate some possible interpretations 
by such a process, but there is no reason, to 
expect convergence on a single critical ob- 
ject. 
In terms of semiotic categories, it seems 
that Collingwood's theory depends upon 
collapsing the sign relationship by omitting 
tlhe central element-the sign itself. This 
leaves identity as the only possible relation 
between the artist and his audience. Pepper 
on the other hand, would eliminate the 
sign's object and reconstitute the sign rela- 
tion between the sign and its interpretant. 
But once the sign's object has been elimi- 
nated, what principle remains by which the 
plurality of interpretations may be limited? 
Dewey seems to have recognized this diffi- 
culty, at least implicitly, by suggesting that 
each act of aesthetic perception creates a 
new work of art. For Dewey the "work" of 
art is literally what it is in a particular 
experience.l3 We might say that Dewey's 
version of the sign relationship recognizes 
only the interpretant. All of these attempts 
to evade the idea of indeterminacy seem to 
be phenomenologically false, insofar as we 
are not disturbed at allowing that there 
may quite legitimately be a continuum of 
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possible interpretations of a single work; 
moreover we want to insist that it is the 
same work which lends itself to these differ- 
ent interpretations. One reason for this in- 
sistence is that experience with art is en- 
riched by coming back to a work and seeing 
it freshly; on Dewey's account we could 
never do this. 
It might be suggested that on this ac- 
count the supreme work of art would be a 
figure like Rorschach's ink-blots, which is 
indefinitely susceptible of interpretation. 
Surely no theory in aesthetics could be 
more compelling than is our knowledge of 
the artistic inferiority of Rorschach's figures 
to, say, a Rembrandt. The differences be- 
tween the Rorschach and the Rembrandt 
are illuminating, however. For one thing, 
while the Rorschach may in a sense give 
rise to a greater diversity of interpretations 
(is it an evil wizard or a peaceful pond?) 
these interpretations have little interrela- 
tion and the viewer, having produced a 
few, quickly tires of the game. The Rem- 
brandt typically gives rise to a variety of 
interpretations which not only tend to be 
interrelated but also to be augmented by 
additional viewings. Moreover, it seems to 
be precisely the more determinate intention 
of the artist which accounts for the greater 
interpretability of the painting. In art, as 
perhaps in political life, the relation be- 
tween freedom and constraint is not simply 
an inverse proportional. To develop this 
notion we would need to have what Peirce 
called a "logic of vagueness." Until we do, 
it should be noted that we are able to make 
distinctions between the trivially and the 
richly vague. The relation of the two prod- 
ucts considered should cause no surprise to 
those acquainted with the arts, for the same 
contrast can be observed on a larger scale 
between a complex and rich artistic tradi- 
tion which offers a wealth of possibilities to 
the artist and one with few constraints and 
little substance where the possibilities for 
innovation are not provided by the context. 
To put the point in a metaphysical way, 
it is not the case that when something be- 
comes more determinate it also becomes less 
indeterminate; rather it may lose its inde- 
terminacy in certain respects while acquir- 
ing other types, perhaps unanticipated.14 
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So, presented with a blank canvas and tak- 
ing a negative attitude toward all tradi- 
tions, the artist may have few real possibili- 
ties of construction although his logical 
possibilities may be infinite. Conversely, a 
highly developed style and iconography do 
not repress the painter's expression but pro- 
vide expressive possibilities. The same 
holds true of the interpreter's situation. 
The blank canvas offers only trivial possi- 
bilities of interpretation, unless supported 
by contextual evidence which leads us to 
see it as a definite move in some style or 
tradition as is the case with much contem- 
porary "impoverished" art. On the other 
hand, difficult and intricate works like the 
Bible and the Homeric epics have been the 
constant delight of interpreters for centu- 
ries. 
III 
At this point it seems necessary to ask 
whether the semiotic theory enables us to 
distinguish art from other sign activities. 
Insofar as any sign has some indeterminacy 
about it, nothing interesting has been 
learned about signs in art. We might be 
inclined to suggest, then, that the ambigu- 
ity or indeterminacy in art is no more se- 
vere than in other areas and may be mini- 
mized, if not eliminated, by the application 
of certain tests and procedures. In this 
sense, the theory might say too much about 
symbols in art by assimilating them to all 
other signs, and providing no grounds for 
distinguishing them from these other signs. 
Suppose we ask how, on the semiotic ac- 
count, a work of art is different from a 
concept. Both are symbols rather than icons 
or indices. Both require interpretation and 
their proper type of interpretant is of a 
general or logical variety. Peirce claims that 
all symbols grow, although the responsible 
inquirer in science or philosophy will at- 
tempt to limit this growth as much as possi- 
ble. All symbols must themselves be general 
and repeatable: concepts are expressed in 
words and works of art can be described by 
a notation if they are not associated with 
some enduring thing like a canvas or a text. 
One important difference, however, seems 
to hinge on the way in which a sign in art 
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may blend or condense several different as- 
pects of signification. Whereas a concept is 
expressed by a word, the material aspect of 
the word does not contribute to its meaning 
and may actually hinder communication if 
it is hard to pronounce or write. When 
language is employed poetically, on the 
other hand, it is difficult to separate its 
meaning as poetry from the sound-se- 
quence. In the sculptures of George Segal 
or the paintings of Jasper Johns, the mate- 
riality of the signs is emphasized so as to 
make their iconicity somewhat suspect. The 
types of complexity that arise in art can be 
regarded mainly in terms of this conver- 
gence of various elements which might be 
separated, for the sake of clarity, in other 
situations.l5 
One way of achieving such complexity is 
to combine various types of representation 
in a single product. A painting may be an 
icon of a certain scene, an index of the 
painter's brush-strokes and a symbol of his 
intentions. In other kinds of symbolism this 
over-determination may be confusing or ac- 
cidental, but in art it is central. Another 
type of complexity is obtained by stressing 
the various aspects of the sign vehicle: a 
sculpture is a sign of a general order (what 
Peirce calls a legisign) because it is endur- 
ing or repeatable; so is a word or a concept. 
Moreover, each requires to be instantiated 
by vehicles with some material aspect- 
sounds or marks in the case of the word and 
a metallic surface, perhaps, in the other. 
Additionally the sign will have some imme- 
diate quality-the way that the words look 
or sound and the immediate visual or tac- 
tile aspect of the sculpture. A work of art 
will characteristically manifest all these as- 
pects at the same time and their intercon- 
nection will be important for determining 
the way in which the sign is to be taken; 
ordinarily we will not pay too much atten- 
tion to the sound of a word and almost 
none at all to its physical vehicle, because 
we rightly suppose that these are related 
peripherally, if at all, to its meaning. 
The sign process in art can also be distin- 
guished from others by noting some charac- 
teristic features of the attitude or type of 
intelligence which art requires. When 
Peirce discusses the characteristics of signs 
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he seems to have in mind the purposes of a 
sign-user who has an interest in discovering 
the correct or proper meaning of a sign, 
and his pragmatic principle is intended to 
help such a sign-user clarify and determine 
his meanings or ideas. If such a sign-user is 
called a "scientific intelligence" (as Peirce 
suggests) then it may be that we need to 
account also for the workings of the artistic 
intelligence. Whereas the scientific intelli- 
gence has an interest in fixing meaning the 
artistic intelligence is committed to multi- 
plying meaning. This may simply be an- 
other way of expressing a Kantian type of 
contrast between the theoretical and aes- 
thetic attitudes: in the theoretical attitude 
we attempt to see things as exemplifications 
of definite concepts, while in the aesthetic 
attitude we tend to contemplate something 
in a variety of ways or see it in a number of 
different lights, without feeling a need to 
focus on only one of these ways or lights. 
We could say that signs of various types 
succeed one another according to different 
sorts of laws or practices. Peirce calls the 
science which "ascertain[s] the laws by 
which in every scientific intelligence one 
sign gives birth to another" pure rhetoric. 
But might we not conceive of different 
types of rhetoric which would deal with 
different types of sign uses? In some areas, 
the sign-process tends to converge: the pos- 
sibility or the hope of such a convergence 
seems to be the ground of scientific inquiry. 
A scientific criticism will wish to apply this 
model to the study of art, supposing that 
the "true" meaning of the work is a kind of 
limit of the process of critical inquiry. It is 
important to remember, however, that this 
model does not flow simply from the struc- 
ture of the sign-relationship but is only one 
way in which signs may "succeed one an- 
other." 
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